We analyze a model that focuses on the export/outsource decision. Outsourcing has the advantage of providing better information about local preferences. The disadvantage is that producing in the host country also means using the inferior technology embodied in the local capital. The decision of whether to offer an outsourcing contract weighs these two effects against each other. The host country accepts the outsourcing contract if the higher price they pay for the outsourced good is worth the benefit of consuming a manufactured good closer to their ideal variety. These results suggest that as low income countries develop they become a more attractive destination for outsourcing because their capital grows to meet production needs and the local market is more lucrative. In addition, the developing low income country finds the outsourcing contract more attractive since their increased demand for the correct variety of the manufactured good increases. This suggests that preference based outsourcing is more likely to occur with higher income host countries.
Introduction
The study of the causes and consequences of outsourcing of production by …rms has received increasing attention since the turn of the century (e.g., Jones, 2000 , Grossman and Helpman, 2002 and 2005 , and Antras 2004 . This literature focuses primarily on the outsourcing decision based on the theory of the …rm, regarding the make-or-buy outcome as an equilibrium phenomenon. 1 Our paper develops a preference-based theory of outsourcing in which outsourcing is bene…cial because it mitigates the information problem with respect to the identi…cation of local tastes for the manufactured good -that is, the local economy is engaged in "design for manufacturing" to suit local preferences. 2 We consider a simple, dynamic framework with the following speci…c features.
There are two countries, a low-income developing local country and a high-income developed source country.
There are two types of goods, a homogeneous good (food, for example) produced only in the local country and a particular variety of a manufactured good (laptop computer, for example) that may be produced in the source or the local country.
Only the source country does R&D to improve the production technology of the manufactured good.
The source country may outsource production of the manufactured good to the local economy.
Only through outsourcing can the source country …rm correctly identify the local economy's variety-speci…c preferences.
Each country employs a speci…c factor. The source country utilizes general capital for production and technology advancement, whereas the local country uses physical capital for production only.
The manufacturers in the source country maximize its value by choosing (i) whether to outsource the production of their good and (ii) the allocation of capital between production 1 Ethier (1986) argues that production outsourcing will occur when information exchanges between the source and local countries are not too costly to prevent arm's length contracting. 2 In a very di¤erent context, Kemp, Shimomura and Wan (2001) investigate gains from trade when trade can change preferences.
and research.
In the local country, an integrated representative consumer-producer decides (i) whether to accept the outsourcer's contract (if o¤ered) and (ii) how to allocate consumption and capital intertemporally (and intersectorally if an outsourcing contract is o¤ered and accepted).
We assume initially the source country exports the manufactured good to the local country, referred to as the export regime. We then identify under what circumstances the equilibrium switches from the status quo to the outsourcing regime. We show that with a su¢ ciently high initial capital stock, the preference of residents in the local country for the manufactured good grows over time to a level that is su¢ ciently high to shift preferences away from the necessity toward the manufactured good. Such shifts enhance the importance of variety-speci…c preferences.
As a result, the local country agents …nd the better matched, outsourced manufactured good more desirable and are more willing to pay for it. The larger price markup over the non-ideal product makes outsourcing more pro…table. Thus, our model features "cross-country complementarity" that triggers the outsourcing equilibrium when local country income is su¢ ciently high.
It is possible that outsourcing may never arise. In particular, this can happen if local country income is su¢ ciently low, capital is scarce, the discount rate high, and its consumers spend a major portion of their income on the necessity. In this case, consumers there care less about the variety of the manufactured good and hence have lower demand. This lower demand drives down the price mark up for outsourced goods thereby giving the source country less incentive to outsource. Hence, for very low income countries the export regime can be the steady state.
The Basic Model
We begin with a very simple model. There are two countries (local and source), two production inputs (general capital and land), and two goods N (necessity) and M (manufactured good.)
There are J varieties j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg , J > 2 of the manufactured good. Denote the j th variety as M j . General capital can be thought of as a composite stock of human, physical and knowledge capital. The necessity is produced in the local country using both local capital and land. However, the manufactured good requires the input of the source country's research capital. Hence, by assumption the manufactured good can only be produced in the local country if it is outsourced. 3 3 We are ruling out the possibility that the local manufacturer can purchase the research capital from the source country. For a paper that looks at this issue see Spulber (2007) .
We focus on two sets of decisions. In the source country, the manufacturer decides (i) whether to export good M j or whether to outsource the production of good M j and (ii) how to allocate capital to production and research. In the local country, an integrated representative consumerproducer decides (i) whether to accept the outsourcing contract (if o¤ered) and (ii) how to allocate consumption and capital intertemporally (and intersectorally if an outsourcing contract is o¤ered and accepted).
Source Country
The source country owns the "high quality" general capital that can be used for either manufacturing or research. Though the allocation of this capital is essential, its accumulation is not the focus of this paper but rather the accumulation of knowledge for production technology is the key.
Thus, denoting this capital stock at the beginning of time t as H t , we assume for simplicity that there is no depreciation or accumulation.
The aggregate general capital stock at the beginning of time t is divided into manufacturing capital (H M t ) and research capital (H R t ):
and the stock of capital remains constant over time:
It is convenient to denote
Ht as the share of research capital, which under (2) also represents the stock of research-use capital.
In addition to research capital we assume that source country …rms can invest in R&D directly.
The timing of decisions is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the existing capital stock H t = 1 is is divided into research uses (s t ) and manufacturing uses (1 s t ). Next, production of the manufactured good occurs based on the current technology (A j t ). Then the R&D investment (z t ) is implemented, which is added to the research-use capital (s t ) to determine next periods production technology (A j t+1 ). This structure allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the state variables to one (A j t only). By assuming for simplicity that the R&D investment and the research-use capital are perfect substitutes, the evolution of manufacturing technology is then governed by:
where > 0 is a technology advancement scaling factor and 2 (0; 1).
Exporting the Manufactured good
Now consider the case in which the source country exports. We assume that the source country does not know the ideal variety of the manufactured good desired by the local country (call this variety i). So, we assume the exporter chooses some variety j 6 = i. Manufacturing capital enters the production of M j t immediately, but research capital only enhances future production of M j t+1 . Assume that the technologies of producing any varieties require identical resources, i.e., there are only horizontal di¤erentiation among di¤erent varieties. The production of a manufacturing product of variety j is therefore given by,
where 2 (0; 1).
Given a constant discount rate r and the exogenous unit cost of R&D investment q t , the Bellman equation facing the representative …rm in the source country producing and exporting the manufactured good to the local country (denoted by superscript EX) can therefore be speci…ed as:
where we have excluded variables taken as given by individuals in the arguments of the value function. That is, the source …rm's value is equal to its current pro…t (revenue from producing and exporting the manufactured good, net of the R&D investment cost) plus its discounted future value.
The …rst-order conditions with respect to s t and z t are:
which equate the marginal bene…t of each of the two choice variables with the marginal cost. The
Benveniste-Scheinkman condition that governs the optimal path of A j t is:
Outsourcing
With production outsourcing, the source country still maintains full control of the technology.
Since it does not produce the manufactured good it uses all of the general capital H t for research purposes. The local country's subcontracting …rm determines the employment of the local capital K M t to manufacture the contracted good. The advantage of outsourcing is that involvement of the local country enables an exact identi…cation of the local ideal variety i.
It is necessary to modify the production of a manufacturing product of the ideal variety i and the evolution of manufacturing technology A i t as follows:
Assume that the outsourcing contract is one featuring revenue-sharing. More speci…cally, the value of the contracted manufacturing output is so divided that a fraction goes to the local country with the remaining fraction to the source country.
The Bellman equation facing the representative manufacturer is now given by,
Compared to the exporting regime, the production technology under the outsourcing regime is unambiguously higher due to complete specialization by devoting the entirety of the general capital to research (s = 1). Yet, the associated pro…t can be higher (as a result of using a better technology) or lower (if the local country's supply of capital is scarce or if the cost of revenue-sharing outweighs the technology gain).
The …rst-order condition and the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition are:
Local Country
We assume that capital in the less developed local economy is of "low quality" in the sense that it can only be used for manufacturing purposes. So, without research capital or spending on R&D (which we rule out) A j t = 0 and the manufactured good cannot be produced by the local company without help from the source country. 4 Denote the aggregate capital stock in the local country at the beginning of time t as K t . Then, capital may be devoted to production of the necessity or production of the outsourced manufactured good.
The entire stock depreciates at a rate 2 (0; 1) and is augmented by gross investment v t , thus evolving according to:
This evolution process is modeled explicitly because it is the only force of growth to the local economy in transition to the steady state.
The production of the necessity takes the simple Cobb-Douglas form:
where 2 (0; 1). The output of the necessity will be partly consumed by the local economy (call this fraction ) and partly exported to the world market (fraction 1 ) at a …xed price, normalized to one.
Denote the subjective time discount rate as > 0. The periodic utility of the representative consumer-producer (of a given ideal taste type i) purchasing manufactured goods of variety j is speci…ed as (index i dropped for notational convenience whenever it does not create any confusion):
which together with (15) implies,
Importing the manufactured good
When the manufactured good is produced in the source country, the optimization problem facing the local country's representative agent is simple: maximize lifetime utility by allocating intertemporally available resources to consumption of one (the necessity) or both goods and capital investment.
In this case, the variety j of the manufactured good provided to the local economy is given in the absence of outsourcing. Thus, we have:
. Given the discount rate > 0, the Bellman equation facing the representative agent in the case where the manufactured good is produced in the source country and exported is given by,
Given > 0, the lower the variety-speci…c preference discounting (higher j ), the greater the marginal utility of consuming the manufactured good (the LHS of (21)). Should the luxurious nature of the manufactured good disappear ( = 0), the variety-speci…c preference discounting will no longer in ‡uence the consumption behavior.
The Benveniste-Scheinkman condition is:
Producing the outsourced manufactured good
When the manufactured good is produced in the local economy via outsourcing, the optimization problem facing the local country's representative agent has to include the allocation of capital between the two sectors (provided that accepting the outsourcing contract is pro…table). With the local economy's involvement, it is assumed that the ideal variety i of the manufactured good can be identi…ed. In this case,
, and
That is, real income accrued to the local country now depends on two sources, both from producing the necessity and from revenue sharing by producing the manufactured good.
The Bellman equation facing the representative agent in this outsourcing case now becomes:
The …rst-order conditions are:
We note that the …rst-order condition with respect to M i t (26) di¤ers from (21) under the exporting regime because there is no variety-speci…c preference discounting under outsourcing. Also in contrast with the previous case, there is an additional …rst order condition (27) that governs optimal capital allocation between the two sectors.
Equilibrium
We next turn to the determination of equilibrium. Consider the following timing of events:
1. The source country determines whether to outsource production of the manufactured good to the local country with a revenue-sharing contract that rewards the local country with a fraction of the surplus accrued.
2. The local country decides whether to accept this outsourcing contract, if o¤ered.
3. Under the exporting or the outsourcing regime, the source country and the local country determine optimal allocations and the equilibrium relative price of the manufactured good is determined as follows.
(OS) p
where t is the share of N t that is consumed in the local country.
Next, we solve for the equilibrium. To satisfy subgame perfection, we solve the problem backward. Before solving the model, however, it is useful to provide a brief comparison between the two market prices of the manufactured goods in units of the necessity. From (29) and (30), there are four channels through which the two manufactured good prices may di¤er:
The …rst channel is through variety-speci…c preference bias. Since the imported manufactured good is less preferred than the locally produced one (under the outsourcing regime) there is less demand and a lower market price, thus j < 1 implies p j < p i . Second, by importing the manufactured good, the local economy can focus exclusively on producing the necessity and greater supply of the necessity leads to a higher relative price of the manufactured good. Third, by exporting the manufactured good, the source country's economy must allocate a portion of capital to its' production. Thus, less capital is allocated to research leading to a slower rate of technological advancement. This in turns lowers the productivity and hence the supply of manufactured good, leading to a higher relative price of the exported manufactured good. Finally, the supply of the manufactured good also depends on the factor input:
assuming that the more advanced source country is capital abundant, it is not clear its productionuse capital is larger than the counterpart in the less developed local country. Thus, the e¤ect on the market prices is ambiguous.
In summary, while variety-speci…c preference bias tends to make the relative price of the manufactured good under the exporting regime lower than under the outsourcing regime, outsourcingdriven production specialization both in the local economy (K N < K) and in the source country (A j < A i ) leads to the opposite outcome. Thus, even without accounting for relative capital abundance (H M vs. K M ), the o¤setting demand and supply forces yields inconclusive results regarding the relative price of the manufactured good under the two regimes. We now proceed to solving for the equilibrium.
Stage 3
We will …rst derive the steady-state solutions in each of the two regimes: exporting and outsourcing.
The Exporting Regime
Under the exporting regime,we can manipulate the …rst-order conditions and the BenvenisteScheinkman condition, (6), (7) and (8), to obtain:
Moreover, from (20) and (22), we have:
Imposing the steady state, (31), (32) and (34) become:
The expression in (37) is the standard modi…ed golden rule in discrete-time neoclassical growth models, which alone pins down the steady-state value of capital in the local economy: K = 
or,
That is, a higher export share of the necessity in the local economy (1 ) makes the local economy richer and demand higher for the manufactured good, which in turn encourages the source country to allocate general capital to production (1 s). In other words, the share of production-use general capital in the source country and the export share of the necessity in the local country are positively related. This relationship is referred to as the exportable production (XP ) locus; see the bottom panel of Figure 1 .
(s + z), which can be substituted into (36) to derive (1 + r) (s+z) =
(1 ) (1 s), or,
Thus, the steady-state level of technology is given by,
Intuitively, more allocation of general capital to R&D substitutes for R&D investment. Because an increase in s decreases z more than proportionately, it results in a net reduction in the steady-state level of technology. 5 We next combine (35), (38) and (41) to obtain:
where
> 0. This gives a positive relationship between the relative price of the necessity ( 1 p j ) and the the export share of the necessity. This relationship is based on the budget constraint and the intertemporal trade-o¤ between current production and technological advancement. We therefore refer to it as the intertemporal trade locus (IT ). It is straightforward to show that the IT locus is not only increasing but strictly concave in 1 ; 1=p j space, with a horizontal intercept, + . 5 More precisely,
Moreover, we can substitute (35) into (33) (imposing the steady state) and utilize (38) to get:
This gives another positive relationship between the relative price of the necessity and the export share of the necessity. This relationship follows from the budget constraint and the marginal rate of substitution conditions. We can think of this as the balance of payments condition and is hence referred to as the balance of payments locus (BP ). The BP locus is strictly increasing and strictly convex in 1 ; 1=p j space, with an asymptote, 1 = (1 ) 2( + ) > + . Intuitively, the BP locus may simply be viewed as the local country's supply curve of the necessity embedded with optimal consumption allocation and trade balance conditions. Thus, it is not surprising that the BP locus slopes upward. The IT locus is somewhat harder to explain.
Precisely, it is a combination of the intertemporal consumption-capital choice by the local country and the capital allocation decision between production and R&D investment by the source country.
Thus, the IT locus does not represent the source country's demand for the necessity and need not be downward-sloping.
Under some regularity conditions, the IT and the BP loci intersect twice, yielding two steadystate solutions (see the top panel of Figure 1 ). By numerical exercises (see Section 3.4 below), we …nd that the low stationary point never arises in equilibrium as it violates some feasibility conditions (particularly, the non-negativity constraint of the production-use general capital). Thus, we will focus exclusively on the high stationary point (point E in the top panel of Figure 1) In response to a greater variety-speci…c preference bias (due to a reduction in 0 or d j ) or a greater preference bias away from the manufactured good (due to an increase in ), the BP locus shifts up whereas the IT locus remains unchanged. As a result, the demand for the manufactured good in the local economy falls, demand for the necessity increases and the export share of the necessity decreases. Due to a reduced valuation of the manufactured good, the value of marginal product of general capital in production decreases and the general capital stock is reallocated from manufacturing to research. However, the value of technological advancements is also lower, which results in less R&D investment. On balance, the steady-state level of technology is lower (the negative e¤ect via z outweighs the positive e¤ect via s). Both lower technology and lower production-use general capital lead to a lower supply of the manufactured good and hence less export this good to the local country. This supply e¤ect turns out to dominate the demand e¤ect (because the local country lacks the option to produce the manufactured good) and the equilibrium price of the manufactured good rises.
In response to more productive R&D, (represented by an increase in ), the IT locus shifts up whereas the BP locus remains unchanged. Thus, the level of technology is higher and the value of technological advancements also rises, thereby increasing the R&D investment. By substitution, the latter enables more general capital to be reallocated to production. As a result of both better technology and more general capital input, the supply of the manufactured good by the source …rm increases, which subsequently lowers the relative price of the manufactured good and encourages the local economy to substitute the manufactured good for the necessity which leads to a higher export share for the necessity.
The Outsourcing Regime
Analogously, under the outsourcing regime, we can use (12) and (13) to derive:
and use (25), (26), (27) and (28) to get:
Note that (45) is a special case of (33) with no variety preference discount (as i = 1).
Imposing the steady state condition, we repeat the same steps, using (46) to obtain the modi…ed golden rule:
which yield the steady-state value of capital allocated to the production of the necessity:
. We then utilize (48) together with the production functions, (4) and (16), to write (45) and (47) as:
which can be combined to yield:
From (15) and (18), we have:
together with (4), (16), (23), (48) and (50), implies:
Substituting (52) into (51), we obtain a fundamental steady-state relationship, which is the BP locus under outsourcing:
where B 1 = 1 + Now, from (10) and imposing the steady state, we have:
By applying (48), (54) and (54), (44) in the steady state can be rewritten as:
which is the IT locus under outsourcing. Unlike the exporting case, the IT locus for outsourcing is downward-sloping and strictly convex in 1 ; 1=p j space, with an asymptote, 1 = + .
The outsourcing equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Next, we obtain:
The comparative statics can be summarized as follows. In response to a preference shift away from the manufactured good (due to an increase in ), the BP locus shifts up whereas the IT locus remains unchanged. As a result, the demand for the manufactured good in the local economy is lower, the export share of the necessity is lower, and the relative price of the manufactured good falls. While the total stock of capital falls due to reduced input into manufacturing the outsourced good (the capital input in the traditional sector remains unchanged), the opposing forces cause ambiguous e¤ects on A j and z.
In response to more productive R&D (represented by an increase in ), the IT locus shifts up whereas the BP locus remains unchanged. Thus, local capital is reallocated from the production of the necessity to the production of the outsourced manufactured good, causing the relative price of the manufactured good to fall, the local consumption of the necessity to decrease and hence the export share of the necessity increases. The total stock of capital increases as a result of more induced demand to manufacture the outsourced good. The steady-state level of technology is unambiguously higher in the absence of sectoral allocation e¤ects in the source country (s = 1).
The e¤ect on the investment in R&D, is ambiguous as higher productivity leads to more investment in R&D via the substitution e¤ect, but less investment due to the factor-saving e¤ect of the better technology.
Stage 2
We turn next to examining whether the representative consumer-producer in the local economy would accept the outsourcing contract. This decision depends on the comparison of the respective value function facing the representative local agent under each regime, which in the steady state can be expressed as:
Using results derived in Stage 3, we have:
When the source country deals with a low-income country, the local economy's export share of the necessity is low and thus, the associated consumption share ( EX ) is high. Due to high discounting ( ), the steady-state value of capital (K) is low. Thus, the direct consumption e¤ect via the …rst term of the value function dominates the indirect trade e¤ect via the third term, making the local agent more likely to import the manufactured good (M j ) than accepting an outsourcing contract. Moreover, the less desirable the manufactured good is, the smaller the gap between the willingness to pay for an ideal variety and the reference variety j. That is, p i OS p j EX is low.
This will be crucial for the next stage to which we now turn.
Stage 1
Finally, we determine whether the representative …rm in the source country would choose outsourcing of the manufactured good over exporting. This is determined by comparing the respective value function facing the representative source country agent under each regime, which in the steady state can be expressed as:
Again, we can utilize results derived in Stage 3 to obtain:
; measuring steadystate revenue gained by the source country …rm (both are an increasing in the local …rm's export share of the necessity, 1 ).
Based on the results from Stage 2, p i OS p j EX is low in the case when the source country is dealing with a low-income country. In this case, the source country has less incentive to outsource.
Thus, the source country will choose to produce and export the manufacture good, so the lowincome local country imports the manufactured good.
Without further speci…cation of the bargaining between the source and the local countries, we can conclude:
Equilibrium outcome Conditions
Numerical Analysis
Since we cannot obtain an analytic solution for the equilibrium prices and allocations we turn to numerical analysis. Our benchmark parametrization is to set both the depreciation rate and the time discount rate at = = 5%, the variety-speci…c preference discounting at j = 0:8, and the real interest rate at r = 10%. The output elasticities of capital are chosen to be = 0:3 and = 0:35, implying the production of the manufactured good is more capital intensive than the production of the necessity. The technology parameters are set at = 0:85 and = 0:9, the real cost of R&D investment at q = 0:3, and the preference bias parameter at = 0:07.
Then, if the equilibrium results in exporting of the manufactured good, the relative price of the manufactured good is p j = 3:63. The comparable …gure under the outsourcing regime with = 0:25 is p i = 3:30. Thus, under the benchmark case, the supply e¤ect dominates the demand e¤ect.
The allocation under each regime is provided as follows. Thus, under the outsourcing regime, the technology in the source country is far better, which generates a "trickle-down" e¤ect via revenue-sharing, enabling the local country to consume more of both goods and to export more of its own products.
Next, we ask which regime arises in equilibrium? Using the benchmark parametrization, our numerical results suggest outsourcing occurs if (but not only if) 2 (0:21143; 0:33179). When (the fraction of output that goes to the host country under outsourcing) is too low, the local country desires to import the manufactured good despite the fact that the source country prefers to outsource. When is too high, the source country no longer o¤ers outsourcing as an option but simply produces and exports the manufactured good. Should the local country feature a relatively high initial capital stock, there always exists a non-empty range of revenue-sharing schemes under our benchmark parametrization such that outsourcing can arise in the steady state. Of course, outsourcing may never arise if (i) local country capital is scarce (due to a su¢ ciently low initial capital stock or an insu¢ cient accumulation of the capital stock as a result of a high time discount rate), (ii) local country income is low (due to a su¢ ciently low capital return associated with low ), or (iii) its consumers spend a major portion of their income on the necessity (due to a su¢ ciently high value of ).
Conclusion
We consider a model that focuses on the export/outsource decision. For the source country the advantage of outsourcing is that the host country partners have better information about local preferences, so the outsourcing outcome involves "design for manufacturing" to suit local preferences. The trade-o¤ is that producing in the host country also means using the inferior technology embodied in the local capital. The decision of whether to o¤er an outsourcing contract weighs these two e¤ects against each other. For the host country, they accept the outsourcing contract if the higher price they pay for the outsourced good is worth the bene…t of consuming a manufactured good closer to their ideal variety. These results suggest that as the low income country develops it becomes a more attractive destination for outsourcing because their capital grows to meet production needs and the local market is more lucrative. In addition, the developing low income country …nds the outsourcing contract more attractive since their increased demand for the correct variety of the manufactured good increases. This suggests that preference based outsourcing is more likely to occur with higher income host countries.
Appendix
We list some useful expressions for computing values.
(EX):
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